Avoiding the Taiwan Strait War: Re-evaluating US Strategic Failures during the Korean War

Yimin (Jeff) Zhou (MIA 2024) is a Columbia University SIPA graduate student under Professor Thomas Christensen, previously on the Board of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. Before SIPA, he founded a successful international business, born and raised in China with a deep understanding of its culture and international relations. His master's thesis at Zhejiang University focused on game theory applications in antidumping, and he holds an MBA from China-Europe International School, blending international insight with extensive management experience.

Xuan Hong John Zhou, an 9th grader at Barstow School Ningbo Campus, is passionate about computer data science and US military theory.

Abstract: In modern times, the Korean War stands out as the sole armed confrontation between the United States (US) and China. This study aims to critically analyze US strategic choices during the Korean War, discern their ramifications, and leverage these insights to propose strategies to prevent potential conflicts in the Taiwan Strait. By harnessing theoretical knowledge gained in academic settings, this exploration delves deep into the war's origins, pinpoints errors in American politics and diplomacy, and seeks early-stage comprehension from the adversary's viewpoint. Such an approach offers valuable lessons for future navigation of the Taiwan Strait crisis. 

The Korean Peninsula in 1950 and the Taiwan Strait today both exhibit notable parallels. Not only is there a similar perception of South Korea and Taiwan being vulnerable adversaries, but the US is also confronting identical communist ideologies and the ambitions of rival leaders in the two scenarios. These corresponding elements collectively amplify and still amplify the potential for conflict.

Background

The US Is Not Ready for the Korean War

On June 25, 1950, President Harry S. Truman reportedly exclaimed, “By God, I’m going to let them [North Korea] have it!”  after the crossing of 90,000 communist troops of the North Korean People’s Army across the 38th parallel, catching the Republic of Korea’s forces completely off guard and throwing them into a hasty southern retreat.[1],[2] On the same day, US General Douglas MacArthur also did not know in advance about the North Korean attack. But he immediately proposed the use of between 30 to 50 tactical atomic bombs to target North Korean air bases and depots, intending to destroy the enemy's air force and its support structures under the veil of night.[3] Additionally, he envisioned using a belt of radioactive cobalt, stretching from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea.[4] Overall, the reaction of both officials demonstrates that the US was not ready for the Korean War and had to scramble to formulate a rapid military response and strategic plan for involvement.

Geopolitical Significance of the Taiwan Strait

The Taiwan Strait holds a geopolitical significance that extends far beyond its physical dimensions. Historically, during World War II, Taiwan was a critical launch point for Japan’s military endeavors in the Philippines and Indonesia, serving as both a staging area and a crucial supply base for Japanese forces in Southeast Asia.[5] Strategically located at the intersection of major shipping lanes, the strait is a vital conduit connecting the South China Sea to the East China Sea, facilitating efficient international trade and commerce. Taiwan's proximity to major regional players further underscores its importance. This prime location cements its status as a critical maritime gateway in East Asia. Additionally, it is a lifeline for the global shipping industry, allowing vessels to transit between vital ports in Northeast Asia and other nations.

Section I: Historical Context

The outbreak of the Korean War (1950-1953)

In 1946, George Kennan's 'long telegram' detailed Stalin’s aggressive policies, prompting his 1947 advocacy in Foreign Affairs for the U.S. to contain Soviet expansion patiently yet firmly, focusing on defense over confrontation.[6],[7]Kennan's strategy emphasized Japan as a central stronghold in East Asia, but notably omitted Taiwan and South Korea, weakening their security relationships despite existing U.S. commitments. This oversight was highlighted when Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in his January 12, 1950, 'Crisis in Asia' speech at the National Press Club, defined a U.S. defense perimeter that excluded both South Korea and Taiwan. This decision was closely monitored by Soviet leaders, and it influenced Stalin to approve North Korea's plan to attack South Korea just two weeks later.[8],[9] At the same time, limited military support from the Truman administration to South Korea, due to worries about potential misuse by Seoul, left the country ill-prepared for battle.[10] Together, these elements weakened regional deterrence and paved the way for the outbreak of the Korean War.

The Taiwan Strait Tensions

Since the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, the US stance on Taiwan has evolved significantly, reflecting changes in international relations and US foreign policy priorities, especially towards the People's Republic of China (PRC). Initially, the US recognized the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan as China's legitimate government, supporting it with military aid and a defense treaty. However, in 1971, the United Nations recognized Beijing over Taipei, a shift the US did not oppose. This change was emphasized by President Nixon's 1972 visit to China and the subsequent US acknowledgment of the "One China" principle, which recognizes only Beijing while maintaining informal ties with Taiwan.[11] In 1979, the US passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), allowing substantial but unofficial relations and defensive arms sales to Taiwan. In 1982, President Reagan's six assurances reaffirmed US support, including continued arms sales without PRC consultation. Additionally, joint communiqués over the years with the PRC affirmed the US "One China" policy, supporting a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question and opposing unilateral changes to the status quo. Recently, the US has increased its unofficial engagements with Taiwan and supported its international presence, all under the TRA, aiming to maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait, deter PRC aggression, and protect US regional interests without formally recognizing Taiwan as an independent state. This nuanced approach continues to shape the strategic dynamics around the Taiwan Strait.

Section II: US Strategic Oversights during the Korean War

Stakeholder Analyzation                                                                                          

The Korean War featured several key players, each with distinct interests. The US, under the United Nations flag, saw the war as a vital battle against communism, part of its broader containment strategy to protect geopolitical interests and assert global leadership. North Korea, led by Kim, launched the war to unify the peninsula under communist rule, backed by Soviet and Chinese support, testing US resolve in the process. South Korea, under President Rhee, aimed to defend its sovereignty and maintain its anti-communist stance with US support.[12] China intervened in October 1950 to support North Korea, aiming to prevent a US-aligned neighbor and assert regional power.[13] The Soviet Union provided North Korea with strategic and material support, using the conflict to expand communism and challenge US influence, while avoiding direct confrontation.[14] General Douglas MacArthur's proposal to use tactical atomic bombs against North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union risked escalating the conflict to a global nuclear war, highlighting the need for a balanced approach considering credible threats and broader strategic implications.

Absence of Deterrence and Credibility

In military strategy, credible assurance and deterrence/compellence theories are crucial in international politics and are key to how states interact and maintain stability.[15], [16] Deterrence aims to prevent actions by adversaries through credible threats of retaliation, while compellence involves coercing an adversary into specific actions. The success of these strategies depends on the perceived credibility of the threats. Credible assurance shows a state's dependability in upholding commitments, essential for maintaining alliances and preventing conflicts. It ensures allies trust in the state’s promises of support or protection. In other words, military power and diplomacy in international behavior focus on discouraging adversaries with the threat of retaliation - effective only if adversaries believe in the capability and resolve of the deterring state.

Before the Korean War, the US faced significant challenges in establishing credible deterrence, marked by internal divisions within its security establishment over defense priorities.[17] In January 1950, Acheson notably excluded South Korea from the US "defensive perimeter" in Asia, despite its strategic position as a bridge between Asia's mainland and the Pacific and its proximity to major powers like China, Japan, and Russia.25 This oversight highlighted diplomatic underestimations of South Korea's importance and was compounded by a sharp reduction in military readiness. US military personnel had reduced by nearly 90% from its 1945 peak, with defense spending falling from 40% of GDP to about 5% by 1950.[18] The quality of military equipment and training had also declined, leaving forces ill-prepared for the Communist offensive in Korea. This resulted in frequent defeats and setbacks against Soviet-trained North Korean and later Chinese units when the US eventually intervened.[19]

Conception and Misconception

The theory of perception and misperception is crucial in International Relations (IR), as it examines how states interpret or misinterpret the actions and intentions of others.[20] These perceptions are shaped by factors such as historical experiences, cultural biases, and the current international context. Often, states engage in conflicts due to misperceptions, misreading intentions, misjudging capabilities, or misunderstanding.

During the Korean War, the perceptions, and misperceptions of key stakeholders—North Korea, South Korea, China, the Soviet Union, and the US—were crucial in escalating the conflict. North Korea, viewing South Korea as politically and militarily weak, believed a rapid invasion would succeed without major opposition from the US. In contrast, the US and its allies underestimated the intentions and capabilities of North Korea and later China, leading to strategic blunders. Historical experiences, like those from World War II and the early Cold War, also shaped US and Soviet perceptions, influencing their decisions about the Korean Peninsula. This misreading of motives played a significant role in the conflict's progression.

Additionally, Mao's role highlights the importance of individual leaders' perceptions. Mao sought to defend China and challenge what he saw as American arrogance, viewing the Korean War as an opportunity to counter US influence.[21]His commitment to socialism and anti-imperialism shaped China's military involvement. Stalin’s assurance to Mao effectively gave him veto power over the invasion plan, underscoring his decisive role in supporting North Korea's invasion.[22] US often oversimplified Mao and Chinese culture, failing to grasp the diversity within China and the nuances of Mao's multifaceted character.[23]

Deterrence and Spiral Model

The theories of deterrence and the spiral model provide essential perspectives on how states often misread each other's actions and intentions.[24] Deterrence theory uses threats to prevent adversaries' undesirable actions, while the spiral model shows how states' security enhancements can be perceived as aggressive, initiating cycles of provocation and escalation. Influenced by the psychological factors of decision-making in international relations, these misinterpretations can lead to conflicts. States acting on faulty perceptions of threat or hostility may unnecessarily start conflicts. This dynamic underscores the complexities of international politics, where defensive measures might be misconstrued as aggressive, thus continuing the conflicts they aim to avoid.

During the Korean War, General MacArthur's decision to cross the 38th parallel involved complex strategic calculations.[25] From a deterrence theory perspective, MacArthur and President Truman had to carefully weigh the potential benefits of entering North Korean territory against the risks of provoking a larger conflict with China, where the costs could far exceed the territorial gains. The credibility of MacArthur's threats and the clarity of his strategic intentions were crucial; advancing without a clear plan for China's possible involvement risked undermining his deterrence effectiveness. Additionally, any further aggression needed clear communication to avoid misinterpretation by all parties involved.

This move inadvertently triggered a classic security dilemma and heightened uncertainties among China and the Soviet Union, who perceived the actions as aggressive and increased their support for North Korea.[26] This exemplifies the spiral model in international relations, mentioned previously, based on the escalation of mutual fears and military readiness.[27] MacArthur's northward push was perceived as provocative, and instead of enhancing security, it only fueled greater instability and conflict.

Section III: Implications and Lessons for the Taiwan Strait

Re-evaluating Strategic Importance

The Korean War underscores that Taiwan's importance extends beyond its geographic location or tech industry. Losing Taiwan could diminish US influence in Southeast Asia and harm its global standing, akin to a small yet crucial component in a larger machine—seemingly insignificant alone but critical to overall US strategy. This perspective highlights why President Truman and Americans were deeply concerned on June 25, 1950, fearing not just the loss of territory but the potential collapse of their broader strategic system.

The Need for Deterrence

The Korean War illustrates the consequences of inadequate deterrence by the US, emphasizing the importance of maintaining a balance to prevent adversaries from perceiving an easy victory. Even if China were to initially succeed as North Korea did, the US retains the capability to counterattack. A US-Taiwan alliance mustn't appear overly threatening to prevent an arms build-up in regions like the Taiwan Strait. Open dialogues ensure decisions are understood, helping to prevent unnecessary conflicts and maintain international peace.

Understanding the leaders of nations like China, where the leader's influence outweighs that of the people, government, and legislative bodies, is critical. These leaders constantly balance national interests, political gains, and economic benefits, making tough decisions inevitable. Recognizing the personal motivations and pressures faced by leaders like Mao is vital for predicting China's international actions, especially in potential crises like those in the Taiwan Strait.

Balance the Relations with China and Allies: Chain-ganging offensive vs. buck-pass defensive

Chain-ganging occurs when states are dragged into conflicts due to alliance obligations, creating a domino effect as the security issues of one ally become entangled with those of others, escalating minor disputes into broader conflicts.[28] In contrast, buck-passing involves states avoiding direct conflict involvement by shifting the burden and risks to other countries, often within the same alliance or region, to reduce their costs and risks.[29] These strategies are essential for understanding state behaviors in navigating complex international alliances and conflicts across various global power centers.

Regarding US support for Taiwan, it is influenced by commitments like the Taiwan Relations Act and a desire to support regional democracies, which could lead to conflict with China if Taiwan is attacked. A strong-willed Taiwanese leader could escalate tensions, potentially drawing promised allies into conflict. Conversely, the US traditionally adopts a cautious approach to Taiwan, aiming to maintain regional stability without provoking China, and encouraging nearby countries like Japan and South Korea to do the same. This strategy of avoiding direct conflicts—akin to WWII-era buck-passing—helps preserve regional relationships but might weaken perceived alliance strength.

Conclusion

         Focused on the Korean War as a blueprint for the current situation in Taiwan, this paper examined the conflicting interests of key stakeholders in the 1950s. It further utilized theories of credible deterrence and assurance to explain why China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea targeted South Korea as their point of attack and how the war strategists considered deterrence while avoiding a spiral escalation. In a scenario where two alliances possess nuclear capabilities, the article argues that escalating armaments and warfare, as proposed by offensive realism, is not the best approach. Instead, it recommends prioritizing diplomatic efforts and credible containment strategies, while also addressing existing conceptions and misconceptions. Alliances should avoid the risks of chain-ganging and buck-passing to ensure efficient navigation of challenges. Lastly, the article emphasized the necessity of conducting in-depth personal and socio-cultural analyses of the Chinese leaders in understanding their decision-making process.

         The wisest course of action for the US regarding the Taiwan Strait is to consistently maintain deterrence while avoiding a spiraling arms race. It is essential to manage the risks of being dragged into conflict through aggressive chain-ganging policies and to organize Asian allies effectively to prevent the dangers of buck-passing, where defense duties are shirked. Maintaining clear and accurate communication with China to prevent misunderstandings is also crucial.

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ENDNOTES

[1] The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “What Was Harry S. Truman’s Reaction to Communist North Korea’s Attempt to Seize Noncommunist South Korea in 1950? | Britannica,” www.britannica.com, December 13, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/question/What-was-Harry-S-Trumans-reaction-to-communist-North-Koreas-attempt-to-seize-noncommunist-South-Korea-in-1950.

[2] History.com Editors, “Truman Orders US Forces to Korea,” HISTORY, February 27, 2019, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/truman-orders-u-s-forces-to-korea-2.

[3] Carl Gnam, “Douglas MacArthur’s Plan to Win the Korean War,” Warfare History Network, August 14, 2017, https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/douglas-macarthur-atomic-bombs-will-win-the-korean-war/.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Joseph A. Bosco, “Taiwan and Strategic Security,” thediplomat.com, May 15, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/taiwan-and-strategic-security/#:~:text=It%20was%20the%20jumping%2Doff%20point%20for%20the.

[6] Office of the Historian, “Kennan and Containment, 1947,” History.State.gov, 2019, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/kennan.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Thomas J Christensen, Worse than a Monolith Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton University Press, 2011).

[9] Miles Maochun Yu, “Green, Yellow, or Red—What Color Was Dean Acheson’s Speech?,” Hoover Institution, March 9, 2017, https://www.hoover.org/research/green-yellow-or-red-what-color-was-dean-achesons-speech.

[10] Matray, James I. “Truman’s Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea.” The Journal of American History 66, no. 2 (1979): 314–33. https://doi.org/10.2307/1900879.

[11] Michael Green, “What Is the US ‘One China’ Policy, and Why Does It Matter?,” Csis.org, January 13, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/what-us-one-china-policy-and-why-does-it-matter.

[12]David P. Fields, “Syngman Rhee: Socialist | Wilson Center,” www.wilsoncenter.org, June 2017, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/syngman-rhee-socialist.

[13] Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, “China’s Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited,” The China Quarterly 121, no. 121 (1990): 94–115, http://www.jstor.org/stable/654064.

[14] Shen Zhihua, “Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin’s Strategic Goals in the Far East,” Journal of Cold War Studies 2, no. 2 (2000): 44–68, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26925062.

[15] Thomas C Schelling, Arms and Influence (S.L.: Yale University Press, 1966).

[16] Glenn Herald Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton University Press, 1961).

[17] James Matray, “View of Dean Acheson’s Press Club Speech Reexamined | Journal of Conflict Studies,” journals.lib.unb.ca, 2002, https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/366/578.

[18] Mike Gallagher and Aaron MacLean, “Why America Forgets—and China Remembers—the Korean War,” Foreign Affairs, July 26, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/why-america-forgets-and-china-remembers-korean-war.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 1976).

[21] Chen Jian, “Chinese and American Misjudgment and the Making and Prolonging of the Korean War | Wilson Center,” www.wilsoncenter.org, June 23, 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/chinese-and-american-misjudgment-and-making-and-prolonging-korean-war.

[22] Thomas J Christensen, Worse than a Monolith Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton University Press, 2011).

[23] Xing Li, “The Conundrum of the Chinese-United States Relationship,” ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu, December 2000, https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/jird/jird_dec00lix01.html.

[24] Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 1976).

[25] US Army Center of Military History, “CHAPTER X: Crossing the Parallel: The Decision and the Plan,” history.army.mil, n.d., https://history.army.mil/books/PD-C-10.HTM.

[26] Francis P. Sempa, “The Rise of China Vindicates MacArthur,” The National Interest, August 5, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/rise-china-vindicates-macarthur-166299.

[27] Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton University Press, 1976).

[28] Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, “Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (1990): 137–68, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300035232.

[29] Ibid.